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Quantum key distribution (QKD) systems provide a method for two users to exchange a provably
secure key. Synchronizing the users’ clocks is an essential step before a secure key can be distilled.
Qubit-based synchronization protocols directly use the transmitted quantum states to achieve
synchronization and thus avoid the need for additional classical synchronization hardware. Previous
qubit-based synchronization protocols sacrifice secure key either directly or indirectly, and all
known qubit-based synchronization protocols do not efficiently use all publicly available information
published by the users. Here, we introduce a Bayesian probabilistic algorithm that incorporates
all published information to efficiently find the clock offset without sacrificing any secure key.
Additionally, the output of the algorithm is a probability, which allows us to quantify our confidence
in the synchronization. For demonstration purposes, we present a model system with accompanying
simulations of an efficient three-state BB84 prepare-and-measure protocol with decoy states. We
use our algorithm to exploit the correlations between Alice’s published basis and mean photon
number choices and Bob’s measurement outcomes to probabilistically determine the most likely
clock offset. We find that we can achieve a 95 percent synchronization confidence in only 4,140
communication bin widths, meaning we can tolerate clock drift approaching 1 part in 4,140 in this
example when simulating this system with a dark count probability per communication bin width
of 8× 10−4 and a received mean photon number of 0.01.
I. INTRODUCTION
Introduced in 1984 [1], quantum key distribution (QKD) is a symmetric encryption pro-
tocol that promises unconditional information security founded on the fundamental laws
of physics, rather than on the difficulty of computational problems. Bennett and Brassard
established the first QKD protocol (BB84), which used the polarization degree of freedom
of single photons to transmit information. Subsequently developed protocols have extended
QKD to different types of systems [2] and relaxed the requirement for a true single-photon
source [3], paving the way for practical implementations of quantum cryptography.
For the sake of concreteness, we consider a polarization-based prepare-and-measure pro-
tocol. Here, one user (Alice) prepares and transmits a periodic sequence of quantum states
with period τA encoded in at least two mutually unbiased orthonormal bases. In our exam-
ple system, we use two bases: horizontal/vertical (H/V) polarization and left circular/right
(L/R) circular polarization. We also use the decoy-state protocol where Alice occasionally
sends the vacuum quantum state. A second user (Bob), measures each quantum state ran-
domly in one of the two bases and records the result. After this measurement phase is
complete, Alice and Bob publish their basis choices for each measurement and keep only
the measurements where Bob registers a click with his single-photon counting detectors and
they use the same basis. This process, called sifting, allows distilling a raw key, which,
after error correction and privacy amplification [4], becomes the secret classical key securely
shared between Alice and Bob. Our example system uses a pulsed stochastic photonic source
with decoy states [3], where the decoys are photonic wavepackets with a lower mean photon
number. To simplify the example system and make it more efficient, we only transmit one
state in the monitoring basis, which gives an equivalent secure key rate in comparison to
transmitting both states in this basis [5, 6].
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A practical issue in quantum communication protocols is synchronizing Alice and Bob’s
two data streams. If Bob does not know precisely when Alice begins data transmission, he
must begin recording measurements early or else risk missing some of Alice’s transmission.
In either case, because signals do not arrive at Bob due to channel loss, and extraneous events
are caused by stray light and detector dark counts, the first event Bob records is unlikely
to be the first event Alice sends, resulting in some timing offset that must be determined.
Correcting this offset is an essential precursor to sifting: If Alice and Bob do not agree on
the timing of the events, they will compare basis choices from different events, resulting
in a high quantum bit error rate (QBER) and likely share no information. In addition,
determining which time bins correspond to Alice’s wavepacket arrival and which do not
allows timing-based noise filtering.
Further complicating the communication protocol is that the relative clock offset may
not be a constant due to drift in the relative phase and frequency between the transmitter
and receiver clocks. Alice has a communication protocol temporal bin width τA that may
be different from Bob’s bin width τB. The timing offset between their clocks ∆ at the n
th
communication time bin since the most recent clock synchronization is given by
∆ = t0 + (τA − τB)n+ ε (1)
for an initial timing offset t0 and higher-order timing error ε. In this way, small differences
in clock frequencies can gradually change the clock offset so that a previously calculated
synchronization is no longer valid. Other timing errors, such as clock jitter and frequency
drift, also contribute to the need for a more robust synchronization solution. We denote the
time over which synchronization is maintained as Tb (mnemonic batch), i.e., the time over
which the error in ∆ τA
Clock synchronization is sometimes achieved by directly sending Alice’s clock signal to
Bob over a separate channel via an optical link or using a radio-frequency signal [7–16]. How-
ever, this introduces additional hardware requirements and increases the cost and complexity
of the setup. One way to avoid these additional resource requirements is to use the quantum
channel itself to transmit the information necessary to perform the synchronization [17–20].
One such qubit-based synchronization protocol was introduced and demonstrated by Calder-
aro et al. [17]. Their protocol uses a dedicated clock-synchronization phase followed by a
key distribution phase. In the synchronization phase, a pre-agreed synchronization string is
transmitted to Bob and the clocks are aligned during post-processing.
Their procedure does not correct for clock frequency drift: It only addresses the initial
session time offset and frequency difference. If the clock frequencies are not consistent, this
method only temporarily aligns until the clock drift becomes of-the-order-of the communica-
tion protocol temporal bin width τA. Correcting for clock frequency drift requires repeated
synchronization/key distribution phases with a regularity that depends on the stability of
the clocks used in the experiment. This reduces the overall secure key rate because no QKD
states can be sent while the synchronization states are being sent, which may result in zero
key rate due to finite-key effects [21, 22].
Our method avoids these limitations by synchronizing the clocks using only information
that is already publicly sent over the insecure classical channel by Alice and Bob for sifting
and security analysis: The basis choices and the mean photon number of the transmitted
signal. Because we are transmitting only one state in the monitoring basis, the basis choices
provide information about which of Bob’s measurement outcomes are more likely. The
decoy state choices, which determine Alice’s mean photon number for each wavepacket, also
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contain information about Bob’s measurement outcomes. For example, Bob is unlikely to
record any detections if Alice sends the vacuum decoy state.
By comparing this information to his measurement outcomes, Bob can probabilistically
determine the timing offset. To account for potential clock drift, Bob can perform this
synchronization in batches of length Tb. Thus, Bob can find the up-to-date timing offset and
ensure that the basis choices he publishes are properly lined up with the ones sent to him
by Alice, but this requires an efficient analysis method to reduce the data requirements. Of
course, our approach as well as Calderaro’s requires low enough channel loss so that there
are enough events received by Bob over a drift interval as discussed below.
Another example of a qubit-based synchronization protocol for a continuously-pumped
entanglement-based QKD systems was introduced by Ho et al. [20]. Here, they correlate Al-
ice and Bob’s detection events without considering basis information. Their synchronization
method relies on Alice’s knowledge that some communication time bins are empty (assum-
ing essentially unit detection efficiency for Alice’s setup) and hence Bob’s corresponding
time bin should also be empty. There is a single dominant peak in the correlation function
that identifies ∆ assuming a large enough number of Bob’s detection events. Because the
detection timing information must already be shared publicly, this strategy does not sac-
rifice any secure key. This method fails when the probability of Alice generating a photon
per communication time bin approaches unity because every time bin is likely to be filled
and hence the correlation function will have multiple high-value peaks that creates timing
ambiguity.
In the next section, we outline our synchronization algorithm and its advantages, and
derive a formula for the synchronization probability using Bayesian analysis. In Sec. 3 intro-
duce a model system, and in Sec. 4 we simulate data in this model system to demonstrate
the effectiveness of our method. In Sec. 5 we present our conclusions and the potential
applicability of this work to other QKD systems.
II. QUBIT-BASED SYNCHRONIZATION ALGORITHM
Similar to previous approaches, our algorithm uses a cross-correlation of Alice’s period-
ically transmitted data and Bob’s received data to find the number of each type of event
pairing, where the cross-correlation is computed efficiently using a Fast Fourier Transform
(FFT). One complication of a prepare-and-measure scheme is that Alice attempts to send a
quantum state every communication time bin, corresponding to the high-photon-probability
limit of the Ho et al. [20] method discussed above. This problem is addressed here using the
decoy-state protocol [3], which must be used anyway to prevent a photon-number-splitting
attack.
Decoy states are sent by Alice randomly and correspond to wavepackets with a mean
photon number smaller than the signal state and often includes sending the vacuum state.
The vacuum state is particularly effective in the synchronization process because Alice has
high certainty that she sent no photons, limited by her ability to completely block the source.
Bob should then also see no photons, limited by the source of detection clicks from non-ideal
effects such as detector dark counts, detector afterpulsing, stray light, and the bleed through
of light from Alice’s source.
Beyond the decoy states, there are additional sources of correlation that can be ex-
ploited to help improve the synchronization process. For example, Alice’s use of the efficient
three-state protocol, where she only sends one state in the monitoring basis, gives useful
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information if Alice and Bob also share basis-state information, which is already required
for sifting. We use a Bayesian statistical method, described below, that uses all prior knowl-
edge of the system characteristics, such as the state fidelities, the mean photon numbers,
the channel loss, the fractional sorting of Bob’s device for the two bases, and the detector
efficiency, we generate a lookup table of Bob’s detection probabilities for Alice’s different
inputs. With these, we can easily compute the synchronization probabilities of different
possible offsets using Bayesian statistics. Alice and Bob’s data is most correlated when they
are synchronized.
A significant advantage of our approach is that it does not sacrifice any secure key: We
only use the information that is already sent publically over the insecure classical chan-
nel. This is an improvement over synchronization protocols that share some fraction of the
raw data for synchronization purposes, as well as protocols that have a dedicated clock-
synchronization phase [17] during which no QKD states can be sent.
Bayesian analysis is a logical choice for synthesizing all available information and using it
to make accurate predictions about ∆. It also has the advantage that it predicts the proba-
bility that ∆̂ is the best estimate of synchronization offset. This allows us to quantitatively
express our level of confidence in the synchronization estimate. Furthermore, the additional
information we incorporate in the protocol allows us to make a decision with fewer received
qubits, which makes the system more robust to clock drift.
A. Synchronization Probability
Here we will use the strings of Alice and Bob’s data. A string of Bob’s data consists of the
results of each of his detectors at each sampling bin. Typically, Bob’s strings are very sparse
because there are many sampling bins in which he registers no detections. A string of Alice’s
data consists of her published information at each sampling bin. If the communication time
bin width is greater than the sampling time bin width, Alice will have multiple string entries
for each state she sends, each corresponding to what she is sending at that part of her duty
cycle. Determining the synchronization probability consists of comparing different strings of
Bob’s data (starting at different temporal offsets) to strings of Alice’s data and calculating
which of Bob’s strings D is most likely to be the one generated by Alice’s corresponding
string. We determine, for a particular string of Bob’s, the probability that it could have
been generated by Alice’s published string.
Mathematically, we phrase this as the likelihood p(D|S) of generating Bob’s string D
given the assumption that its generating string is the one Alice has published, denoted by
S. The uninformed assumption, which we will denote as S̄, is that Bob’s string D has
been generated by a random string other than Alice’s published string (from some other
portion of Alice’s sent data), with the stipulation that the other string is also periodic. This
mathematical framework will consider a subset of Alice’s data of N sampling bin widths
compared against a subset of Bob’s data of N +M sampling bin widths, meaning there will
be M possible offsets to consider.
To begin in our protocol formalism, we note that D is a string of length M + N of
Bob’s measurements at each sampling bin (including sampling bins where no detections
were received). Each measurement Bi in Bob’s string consists of the click or no-click results
at all of Bob’s detectors. Bob’s string D can be written as
D = {B1, ..., BM+N}, (2)
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which we can rewrite as
D = {B1, D′}, (3)
where
D′ = {B2, ..., BM+N}. (4)
We prefer to write the likelihood p(D|S) in terms of known quantities such as the p(B1|S),
the conditional probability of a time bin measurement B1 given S. Using this notation,
p(D|S) is given by
p(D|S) = p(B1, D′|S) = p(B1|D′, S)p(D′|S), (5)
where the final equality is a result of the product rule. Because we have assumed that B1
is generated from Alice’s string, knowing D′ gives us no additional information about B1.
At best, it informs us whether S true, which is already assumed; the bits are otherwise
independent because Alice’s sequence is random. Using these observations, we obtain






allowing us to write the likelihood as the product of the measurement probabilities at each
sampling bin. We note that even in the example where Alice only sends one state in the
monitoring basis, Bob must still measure both states in each basis to detect potential eaves-
dropper attacks [5, 6]. For computational ease, we also determine each sampling bin mea-
surement probability as the product of the probabilities of the outcomes at the four different





Again, because the detector events are assumed to be generated by independent random
processes, these probabilities can be considered independent when the generating string is
known.
When the generating string is not known (under the uninformed assumption S̄), the
detection probabilities can be approximated as independent when the received mean photon
number is low. Because the synchronization task is most difficult in low-signal regimes, we










For a given input from Alice, each of Bob’s four detectors has an opportunity to detect a
photon above the detection clicks arising from non-ideal behaviors. Naturally, we will use
our knowledge of the system (the state fidelities, the quality of the polarization sorting, the
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dark count rates, the detector efficiencies, and the signal and decoy received mean photon
number) to estimate the detection probabilities as accurately and efficiently as possible.
Using a lookup table of the detection probabilities for the different inputs from Alice, these
likelihoods can be calculated using standard statistical methods.
However, the likelihood of generating D from Alice’s published string is not the same
as the probability that Alice’s published string is the one that generated D, which is given
by p(S|D) and is the most relevant quantity to determine synchronization. Bayes’ theorem




In addition, we must also include the information that we expect exactly one correct syn-
chronization offset (not just one on average).
To formulate the problem as an exclusive synchronization, we must find the probability
that some discreet timing offset, given by the time-bin index j, is the correct synchronization
offset, and that all the other offsets are incorrect. In other words, the probability that, for
a given string of length N published by Alice, all the measurements before the jth bin are
generated randomly, the measurements from j to j+N are generated from Alice’s published
string, and the measurements after j+N are generated randomly. Under these assumptions,
we can write p(B1, ..., BM+N |Sj) as a product of the likelihoods of these three sections as
p(B1, ..., BM+N |Sj) = p(B1, ..., Bj−1|S̄j)p(Bj, ..., Bj+N |Sj)p(Bj+N+1, ..., BM+N |S̄j). (12)
Here we introduce S̄j, the assumption that the data is produced by a random string other
than the synchronization string in question, but one with the same phase (i.e., the signal
arrives at the same time bin in each period as it does for Sj).
We can find the conditional probability for matching Alice’s string to Bob’s string at a
potential synchronization index j in this framework using Eq. 11, which gives
p(Sj|B1, ..., BM+N) =
p(B1, ..., BM+N |Sj)p(Sj)
p(B1, ..., BM+N)
. (13)
Equation 13 is our main result and is the quantity of interest to identify clock synchronization
between Alice and Bob. We determine the optimum synchronization index based on the
value of j that maximizes this quantity, and the quantity itself gives us our confidence in
that choice.
The denominator in Eq. 13 can be written in terms of known quantities using marginal-
ization. Marginalization consists of rewriting a probability as a sum of the comprehensive
conditional probabilities; in this case, the different possible synchronization indices written
as
p(Sj|B1, ..., BM+N) =
p(B1, ..., BM+N |Sj)p(Sj)
M∑
i=1
p(B1, ..., BM+N |Si)p(Si)
, (14)
where the i denotes the other potential synchronization indices.
To evaluate Eq. 13, we the likelihoods p(B1, ..., BM+N |Sj) and p(B1, ..., BM+N |Si) can
be determined using Eqs. 7, 9 and, 12. The quantity p(Sj), called the prior, is the ad hoc
probability that D corresponds to Alice’s published string. That is, that we are at the
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correct synchronization index. We use a uniform prior, which assumes each candidate has
a näıve 1/M probability of being the correct one given that we have M candidate indices,
which means that




so that the prior terms cancel, giving us
p(Sj|B1, ..., BM+N) =
p(B1, ..., BM+N |Sj)
M∑
i=1
p(B1, ..., BM+N |Si)
. (16)
Next, we apply Eq. 12 to obtain
p(Sj|B1, ..., BM+N) = (17)
p(B1, ..., Bj−1|S̄j)p(Bj, ..., Bj+N |Sj)p(Bj+N+1, ..., BM+N |S̄j)
M∑
i=1
p(B1, ..., Bi−1|S̄i)p(Bi, ..., Bi+N |Si)p(Bi+N+1, ..., BM+N |S̄i)
and use Eqs. 7 and 9 (of which the latter uses a low received mean photon number approx-
imation) to write everything in terms of known quantities as























Equation 18 is our master equation for the synchronization probability of an index j.
The numerator consists of the probability of an N -length string of Bob’s data starting at j
being produced by Alice’s published string, along with the probability that the remaining
data was produced by an unknown string of Alice’s data. The denominator sums this same
quantity over all possible synchronization indices, ensuring normalization. We take the value
of j that maximizes this quantity to be the optimum synchronization index, and the value
of p(Sj|B1, ..., BM+N) gives us the probability that we are correct. We can compute this
conditional probability using FFTs to count the number of each unique bin measurement
along with a lookup table of the probabilities of the events.
III. MODEL SYSTEM
To illustrate our protocol, we simulate a model QKD system using a polarization-based
prepare-and-measure protocol with decoy states and only sending one state in the monitoring
basis. We set Alice’s repetition rate to be fA = 1/τA and a wavepacket duration of ∆t =
τA/m with m = 8 for a duty cycle of 12.5 percent. We set Bob’s sampling rate to nfA with
n = 8 so that his sample period is matched to the wavepacket duration. These conditions
are illustrated in Fig. 1. Alice generates a pseudorandom sequence such that four quantum
states L/R/H and a vacuum decoy state (a decoy state with mean photon number equal to
zero) are sent in equal parts on average.
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FIG. 1. Illustration of the relative times used in the QKD protocol. Here, the signal (red) straddles
bins 1-2 due to an offset of ∆, and we do not consider bins 3-8. We take τA = τB, which is
approximately correct for a short enough data subset.
For our numerical experiments, we simulate a QKD session by generating data that
emulates the state preparation and measurement, including aspects such as the received
mean photon number µ, probability of a detector dark count d over one communication
bin width τA, and variation in ∆ due to clock drift, assumed to be constant over Tb. This
allowed us to test how these factors impact the synchronization performance. We assume a
transmitted mean photon number µA = 1 where the received mean photon number µ = ηµA
for a channel transmission η. While this µA is on the upper end of values used in typical
experiments, it allows us to explore the performance and limitations of our algorithm at or
beyond the greatest received mean photon number one would realistically use: µA = 1 with
zero loss.
Assuming a Poisson distribution for Alice’s source, the probability of Bob registering a
click p(click) over a period τA at a particular detector ` is given by
p(click, `) = 1− (1− d)eµ` (19)
where µ` is the mean photon number received by detector `. The portion of the total mean
photon number µ that goes to the different detectors depends on which polarization state is
sent. We use ideal BB84 sorting in our model system so that all states have an equal chance
of being measured in either basis. States measured in the same basis as they are prepared
are detected accurately, while states measured in the opposite basis have an equal chance
of being measured in either opposite-basis state. For example, if Alice prepared an H-state
that Bob receives µ = 0.8, Bob’s measures µH = 0.4, µv = 0, and µL = µR = 0.2.- In the
low-µ limit, Eq. 19 can be approximated as
We assume that the observation window is long enough so that the p’s and µ’s can be
estimated accurately from the finite number of observations. This means the average click
probability can be extracted from the Bob’s raw data and we rewrite Eq. 19 as a function




















which just sums the average mean photon number of the different detectors and multiplies
by a factor of 4/3 to account for the fact that we are sending vacuum states 25% of the time.
We divide the data set into subsets duration Tb and perform synchronization and sifting
on each subset. Bob can record up to 8 events (each of which may or may not include
a detection event or dark count) assuming that the detector deadtime is less than Bob’s
sampling time. However, because the clocks can only be synchronized to a resolution of
Bob’s sampling bin width, we expect Alice’s wavepacket to straddle 2 bins as illustrated
in Fig. 1, with the end bins only having a partial wavepacket. The remaining 6 bins only
contain dark counts, which can be discarded after we determine ∆ to reduce noise. This
amounts to detector time-gating in the post-analysis.
We assume that Bob begins recording before Alice begins transmitting, and continues
to record after she stops sending, so our received data is bookended by low signal regions.
We find a best-fit step function to identify where the transmission begins and ends, which
gives us a coarse approximation of the synchronization index. For a range of different string
lengths N that determine the number of sampling bin widths in each synchronization subset,
we examine a window of M = 4, 000 nearby potential synchronization indices. This value
is chosen based on the typical precision of the coarse approximation of the synchronization
given by the best-fit step function.
IV. SYNCHRONIZATION SIMULATIONS
To verify that our algorithm returns an accurate probability of synchronization, we run
1,000 simulated trials with a known synchronization index and compared the average cal-
culated probability of synchronization p(Sj|B1, ..., BM+N) to the average rate of finding the
correct index, which we denote by f(Sj|B1, ..., BM+N), in Fig. 2. If our model is accurate,
then p(Sj|B1, ..., BM+N) ∼ f(Sj|B1, ..., BM+N), in which case we can take p(Sj|B1, ..., BM+N)
to be a reliable metric for quantifying our confidence in obtaining the correct ∆.
We see that p(Sj|B1, ..., BM+N) ∼ f(Sj|B1, ..., BM+N) to within our errorbars for mod-
erate channel loss (Fig. 2a). However, p(Sj|B1, ..., BM+N) is consistently larger than
f(Sj|B1, ..., BM+N) for the case of zero channel loss (Fig. 2b), a condition that is un-
likely to be encountered in an experiment but highlights the limitation of our algorithm.
This result is not surprising given that our derivation given in Sec. II assumes low µ to
arrive at Eq. 9. Assuming a transmitted mean photon number of 1, Fig. 2 (b) corresponds
to a zero channel loss system. This represents an upper limit on µ encountered in a typical
decoy state protocol where µA . 1 and thus, also serves as a lower bound on the accuracy
of our calculated synchronization probability.
A lower received mean photon number means a lower density of detected events. Because
detected events provide more information than no-detection events, a lower µ requires us
to consider a larger set of sampling bin widths N to achieve the same synchronization
confidence. Despite the fact that p(Sj|B1, ..., BM+N) does not match f(Sj|B1, ..., BM+N) as
well at higher values of µ, we can still achieve equivalent average values of f(Sj|B1, ..., BM+N)
at lower values of N . This fact is also illustrated in Fig. 3, where we see a direct correlation
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FIG. 2. Bob’s required data record length needed to determine synchronization for two different
channel transmissions of (a) η = 0.05, corresponding to µ = 0.05 and (b) η = 1, corresponding
to µ = 1. We also show the probability of not obtaining synchronization, which better highlights
transition to high-certainty synchronization.
between µ and N at which the synchronization probabilities converge to one: The higher
values of µ converge at lower values of N .
Another way to view this relation between µ, N , and p(Sj|B1, ..., BM+N) is to consider
the string length N required to achieve a particular synchronization confidence as a function
of µ as shown in Fig. 4. For high µ and low N , we observe an approximately linear relation
between log10µ and log10N with a slope of ∼ -1, which means that N 1/µ. For lower µ,
where there are fewer events and dark counts play a larger role, the probability curves exhibit
steeper slopes, demonstrating that synchronization becomes increasingly difficult. This data
can be used to estimate whether it is possible to synchronize over an experimentally measured
temporal block length Tb and, if it is possible, how low a value of µ can be tolerated while
still synchronizing reliably. As a concrete example, Bob needs 33,110 sampling bin widths, or
about 4,140 communication bin widths, to achieve a 95% confidence for clock synchronization
for µ = 0.01 and d = 8×10−4. This means we can tolerate clock drifts approaching 1 part in
4,140 because our method assumes that the clock drift is much less than one communication
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FIG. 3. Average calculated synchronization probability as a function of string length on a
logarithmic scale for different received mean photon numbers. The probability of registering a
dark count during one communication bin width is d = 8× 10−4.
bin width.
FIG. 4. Dependence of string length threshold to achieve 95 percent synchronization confidence
on received mean photon number on a logarithmic scale, parameterized by different dark count
probabilities.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, we develop a novel probabilistic approach to qubit-based clock synchroniza-
tion using Bayesian analysis. By exploiting correlations between information Alice shares
publicly, such as basis and decoy state choices, and Bob’s detection events, we can find
the correct synchronization clock offset without sacrificing any secret key. Additionally, our
algorithm is more robust to noise, loss, and clock drift in comparison to other protocols by
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incorporating all publicly available information using the Bayesian framework. Finally, we
demonstrate that our algorithm is successful and robust using a simulated BB84 communica-
tion scheme, which confirms that our synchronization metric corresponds to the probability
of synchronization, especially in the low-µ limit. Our algorithm is applicable to other QKD
systems that use other degrees-of-freedom of the photon for which it is possible to divulge
some timing information.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This material is based on research sponsored by NASA under grant 80NSSC20K0629
and the Air Force Research Laboratory and the Southwestern Council for Higher Educa-
tion under agreement FA8650-19-2-9300. The U.S. Government is authorized to reproduce
and distribute reprints for Governmental purposes notwithstanding any copyright notation
thereon. The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and should
not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either
expressed or implied, of NASA, the Southwestern Council for Higher Education and the Air
Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), or the U.S. Government. R.D.C. acknowledge discus-
sions of the Bayesian analysis with Richard Furnstahl. All code and data used in simulations
is publicly available on GitHub:
https://github.com/roderickdcochran/qubit_based_synchronization
[1] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution and coin
tossing, Theor. Comput. Sci. 560, 7 (2014).
[2] A. Ekert, Quantum cryptography based on bell theorem, Phys. Rev. Lett. 67, 661 (1991).
[3] H.-K. Lo, X. Ma, and K. Chen, Decoy state quantum key distribution, Phys. Rev. Lett. 94,
230504 (2005).
[4] C. H. Bennett, F. Bessette, G. Brassard, L. Salvail, and J. Smolin, Experimental quantum
cryptography, J. Cryptology 5, 3 (1992).
[5] N. T. Islam, C. C. W. Lim, C. Cahall, J. Kim, and D. J. Gauthier, Securing quantum key
distribution systems using fewer states, Phys. Rev. A 97, 042347 (2018).
[6] K. Tamaki, M. Curty, G. Kato, H.-K. Lo, and K. Azuma, Loss-tolerant quantum cryptography
with imperfect sources, Phys. Rev. A 90, 052314 (2014).
[7] V. D’Auria, B. Fedrici, L. A. Ngah, and et al., A universal, plug-and-play synchronisation
scheme for practical quantum networks, npj Quantum Inf 6, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41534-
020-0245-9 (2020).
[8] B. Korzh, C. C. W. Lim, R. Houlmann, N. Gisin, M. J. Li, D. Nolan, B. Sanguinetti, R. Thew,
and H. Zbinden, Provably secure and practical quantum key distribution over 307 km of optical
fibre, Nat. Photonics 9, 163 (2015).
[9] Y. Liu, T.-Y. Chen, J. Wang, W.-Q. Cai, X. Wan, L.-K. Chen, J.-H. Wang, S.-B. Liu, H. Liang,
L. Yang, C.-Z. Peng, K. Chen, Z.-B. Chen, and J.-W. Pan, Decoy-state quantum key distri-
bution with polarized photons over 200 km, Opt. Express 18, 8587 (2010).
[10] P. Liu and H.-L. Yin, Secure and efficient synchronization scheme for quantum key distribu-
tion, OSA Continuum 2, 2883 (2019).
13
[11] N. Walenta, A. Burg, D. Caselunghe, J. Constantin, N. Gisin, O. Guinnard, R. Houlmann,
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